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Mass movements that are able to overthrow a dictator do not always lead to democracy. Transition 
periods present narrow windows of opportunity in which activists face difficult decisions to build 
democracy and prevent authoritarian relapse. Existing scholarship offers limited guidance for pro-
democracy forces because it focuses on unchangeable structural factors and cases with a known 
outcome. We propose an innovative approach for finding informative comparisons for ongoing 
transitions after authoritarian breakdowns. We quantify the similarity between all breakdowns 
caused by mass uprisings since 1945 based on their structural preconditions. We then apply our 
approach to Sudan's ongoing transition and draw lessons from three similar cases: Benin in 1990, 
the Philippines in 1986 (successful democratization) and Burma in 1988 (failed democratization). 
Our case studies suggest that democratic transition is possible in Sudan if pro-democracy forces 
maintain unity, build inclusive political agendas and keep the military committed to the democratic 
process. 
 




















Mass uprisings against autocratic rule are rare and unexpected events that raise hopes of 
democratization. Yet overthrowing a dictator is only the first step. Daunting tasks still lie ahead 
for pro-democratic forces after they have ousted a dictator, as most mass uprisings against 
authoritarian rule do not result in democracy. According to Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), 
only 41% of mass uprisings that ousted dictatorships after the Second World War were followed 
by democratization. Pro-democratic forces face a myriad of challenging decisions after an 
autocrat’s ouster, for instance, about whether to engage in formal politics, prosecute or 
compromise with old regime elites, or whether to unite behind one pro-democratic leader or 
encouraging political pluralism.  
What can political actors do in the wake of authoritarian regime breakdown to facilitate democratic 
transition? How can they learn from other historical cases? This study employs an innovative 
approach to address these questions. Building on advances in matching methods (Nielsen 2016), 
we propose a framework for selecting comparative cases in studies of democratic transitions. We 
identify 22 structural factors, including democratic history, military size and level of development, 
that extant political science scholarship relates to a country’s chances of democratization and that 
are exogenous to the decisions of political actors during the transition period. Keeping these 
factors constant allows us to find cases of successful and failed transitions in which actors' 
decisions most likely made a difference and that hold lessons for pro-democracy forces operating 
under similar structural conditions.  
As a proof of concept, we present a comparative case study of the ongoing transition in Sudan, 
with historical cases of successful and failed democratic transitions selected through our matching 
analysis. The method points to cases beyond Africa and the Middle East that experts may not 
necessarily consider when thinking about comparative cases and yet can shed light on the uprising 
that ousted Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019. These cases are Benin in 1990, the 
Philippines in 1986, and Burma/Myanmar in 1988. Whereas Benin and the Philippines successfully 
transitioned to democracy after their dictator was toppled, Burma/Myanmar did not. We suggest 
that this heterogeneity in outcomes despite similar structural conditions points to an important 
role for actors’ decisions in determining whether a country democratizes or not. Our case studies 
suggest that democratic transition might be possible in Sudan if pro-democracy forces maintain 
unity, build inclusive political agendas, keep factions in the military committed to the democratic 
process and secure international support. 
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Our approach makes several contributions to existing research on democratic transitions. First, 
instead of comparing countries that are geographically or culturally proximate, we use a 
theoretically motivated list of structural factors that previous research has deemed important for 
transitions. This allows us to find comparative cases that may not be obvious at first sight and can 
be highly informative. Second, existing scholarship focuses largely on structural factors like 
economic development or natural resources that activists cannot change. Building on this 
scholarship, we show that after controlling for these factors, there is still substantial variation in 
democratization outcomes, which we attribute to the actors’ agency. Finally, we depart from 
existing scholarship by comparing a transition with a yet unknown outcome to completed cases. 
We argue that these theoretically-founded comparisons are especially valuable for transitions that 
are still ongoing because this is the phase where comparative evidence is most needed. 
Learning from “most similar” transitions 
Political scientists often compare different countries, regions, or organizations in order to explain 
political phenomena. A large literature is devoted to designing methods for the optimal selection 
of cases for improving inference (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; Brady and Collier, 2004). In 
both quantitative and qualitative research traditions, the goal is often to select cases that are most 
similar on some set of structural characteristics and only differ on one independent variable of 
interest (Iacus et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2007). Such “most similar” case selection, in reference to John 
Mill’s work also called Method of Difference, is challenging in practice because a very large number 
of factors could theoretically be relevant, and it is unclear which ones to choose (“many variables, 
small number of cases” [Lijphart, 1971: 685]).  
Given these difficulties, scholars often select cases that are geographically proximate and share a 
common culture, history or civilization to account for multiple and potentially unobserved 
structural differences that could confound the results (Anckar, 2008). Although valid (see e.g., de 
Meur and Berg-Schlosser, 1996; Morency-Laflamme, 2018), this approach limits what lessons can 
be learned when we are interested in one case in particular – such as Sudan 2019 – as the number 
of comparable cases from neighboring countries might be very small. This is an issue, in particular 
when studying rare events such as authoritarian regimes breakdowns or mass uprisings. In 
addition, factors other than geographical proximity and cultural similarity can be important 
structural confounders. Thus, in many studies, cases from other world regions could be more 
suitable for systematic comparison. As a recent study by Bogaards (2019) reveals, many case studies 
in democratization research only apply systematic rules to case selection implicitly, if at all, which 
limits our ability to draw valid conclusions from country comparisons. 
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Moreover, existing scholarship emphasizes structure over agency. A large scholarship assesses the 
effects of a country’s background characteristics – including the level of economic development 
(Boix, 2003), reliance on oil resources (Ross 2001), and civil society strength (Brownlee, Masoud, 
and Reynolds, 2015) – on democratization. In contrast, agent-oriented approaches focus on elite 
actors and the decisions that they take (Di Palma, 1990), including whether to demobilize 
(Ketchley, 2017), hold early or late elections (Brancati and Snyder, 2013), and whether to prosecute 
former regime elites (Quinn, 2009). While the latter is gaining some traction (Pinckney, 2020), 
structuralist explanations are still more common but less useful for those who want to push for 
democratization because they cannot alter structural conditions in the short run. 
Finally, scholarly research mainly focuses on completed, past transitions offering little guidance 
for pro-democracy activists when they need it most, namely while a transition is ongoing. While 
this approach is perfectly in line with the scientific method, it neglects that important lessons from 
other cases can be drawn without knowing the outcome of the main case of interest. 
We propose an approach for finding useful comparisons for ongoing transitions after authoritarian 
breakdowns focusing on what actors can do to increase the chances of a successful transition. As 
a first step, we compile data on various structural background factors that affect whether or not a 
country is more or less likely to democratize for all cases of authoritarian breakdowns caused by 
mass uprisings since 1945. Second, we quantify the similarity between them using the Mahalanobis 
distance (Ho et al., 2007; Imai and Ratkovic, 2014), a widely used metric for measuring similarity 
between observations in quantitative and qualitative research (Nielsen 2016). The method allows 
us to identify most similar cases among the universe of cases. Third, we apply our methods to 
Sudan as a case of an ongoing transition and conduct a small-n case comparison with cases with 
similar structural preconditions. We draw lessons from actors’ choices in Benin and the Philippines 
(successful democratization) and Burma/Myanmar (failed democratization) to identify takeaways 
for pro-democracy forces in Sudan. 
Identifying and quantifying structural conditions  
Our universe of cases consists of all authoritarian regime breakdowns prompted by mass uprisings 
since 1945. The list of regime breakdowns caused by mass uprisings is based on the Authoritarian 
Regimes Dataset by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (GWF, 2014), which covers the period 1945-2010. 
 7 
For the post-2010 years, we added six cases of breakdowns based on a review of the relevant 
literature, which leaves us with 44 cases in total since 1945.1  
We treat those cases as successful that had become and remained democratic within five years 
after the breakdown.2 By these standards, 24 countries had successfully transitioned to democracy 
and 18 had failed – including Sudan in 1985. In two cases, Algeria (2019) and Sudan (2019), the 
outcome of the transition is still unknown.  
Our objective is to derive a measure of similarity between cases of regime breakdown. To do so, 
we conducted a review of existing scholarship on democratic transitions and compiled a list of 22 
structural variables believed to influence democratization.3 Our selected variables cover seven 
major areas: economic development, civil society, regime type, democratic legacies, instability, 
inequality, demographics, and regional factors. A full list of variables can be found in Table 1. 
First, we include variables that capture countries’ different levels of economic development. Economic 
factors matter for democratization in multiple ways (Haggard & Kaufman, 2018). According to 
modernization theory (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009), economic development helps to build up and 
empower pro-democracy forces by increasing citizens’ economic and social resources. Economic 
crises are, in some cases, a direct cause of autocratic breakdown and weigh heavily on the transition 
process (Przeworski, 1995). In addition, economic development is associated with capital mobility, 
which is why elites in well-developed regimes might be more open to democracy as they can evade 
taxes (Boix, 2003). In the matching analysis, we, therefore, include total GDP per capita, GDP 
growth per capita (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015) and infant mortality as an indicator for 
development (Coppedge et al. 2020, based on gapminder.org). Existing research also emphasizes 
the importance of natural resources for authoritarian persistence and democratization, which is 
why we add data on oil and gas production per capita (Ross & Mahdavi, 2015; Ross, 2001). 
Second, we include a measure of civil society strength. A strong civil society is a crucial prerequisite 
for successful democratization (Bernhard & Karakoc, 2007). The degree of organization of civil 
society affects the dynamics of mass-based mobilization and has an impact on whether or not 
opposition forces can organize and negotiate about the transition outcome with former regime 
elites and the military. Civil society strength also matters for stabilizing democracy once it has been 
established as it increases accountability of the state (White, 1994). Some authoritarian regimes do 
                                                     
1 Egypt (2011), Tunisia (2011), Libya (2011), Yemen (2012), Algeria (2019), and Sudan (2019).  
2 For the cases until 2010, we used GWF’s coding of democracy. For the other six, we based this assessment on V-
Dem’s Regimes of the World measure (Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg 2018).  
3 For an overview of relevant factors, see Geddes (2013). 
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not permit any kind of civil society activity, while others allow limited engagement. V-Dem’s core 
civil society index provides an aggregated measurement of government control over, and 
repression of civil society (Coppedge et al., 2020: 275) and thus takes these important differences 
between regimes prior to regime breakdown into account. 
Third, we consider differences in regime type of the outgoing regime and potential legacies as they 
profoundly shape a country’s pathway to democracy. For instance, prospects for democratization 
look different after the breakdown of military or single-party regimes. Militaries with a history of 
being in power are determined to maintain their prerogatives at the end of the transition (Brownlee 
et al., 2015), and they are likely to intervene in short democratic experiments (Bratton & Van de 
Walle, 1997). More generally, a loyal military is crucial to keep dictators in power during “endgame 
scenarios” (Croissant et al., 2018). Therefore, we include recently developed measures of the 
executive’s power base. Teorell and Lindberg (2019) provide a continuous measurement of the 
importance of the military, a dominant party and hereditary rule. Emphasizing the crucial role of 
the military as the ultimate arbiter of major political decisions, we add information on the military 
personnel per capita and military spending per capita from the Correlates of War project (Singer, 
Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972). Moreover, we add an indicator for the protection of human rights under 
the old regime (Fariss, 2014), the level of electoral democracy (from V-Dem), and the democratic 
experience a country has accumulated up to the point of regime breakdown. This helps us to 
identify cases with similar democratic legacies, similar ruling structures, and levels of state 
repression.  
Fourth, a country’s history of (in)stability affects prospects for future stability. Coup d’états are a 
prime challenge for democracy and past coups are, together with other factors, a good predictor 
for future coups (Belkin & Schofer, 2003). For that reason, our matching approach uses 
information on the length of tenure of the previous authoritarian leader and the number of 
previous coup attempts. Countries with a long history of attempts to remove the leader are likely 
different from countries with very few coup attempts. These data are taken from the Rulers, 
Elections, and Irregular Governance (REIGN) dataset data set (Bell, 2016). Similarly, we include 
information on the level of intra-state conflict during the last five years before regime breakdown 
using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Sundberg & Melander, 2013). Intra-state 
conflicts such as civil war or territorial conflicts make it more challenging to achieve consensus on 
the future path of the country and produce grievances that can cast a shadow on the transition 
process. 
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Fifth, we include two V-Dem measures of inequality: Power distribution by urban-rural location 
and group equality with respect for civil liberties. Inequality is said to facilitate civil conflict as 
excluded groups have strong incentives to challenge the status quo and demand more equality. 
More equal societies also have a higher likelihood of successful transitions as the “redistributive 
impact of democracy diminishes” (Boix, 2003: 3), and elites are more likely to allow universal 
suffrage. The V-Dem measures allow us to select cases that are comparable in terms of inequality 
before regime breakdown. 
Sixth, there are important demographic factors to take into account. For instance, small countries are 
expected to have more input legitimacy, as they usually have more homogeneous societies (Dahl 
& Tufte, 1973). We use data on population size from the Correlates of War project (Singer et al., 
1972). Moreover, we know about the importance of the religious composition of a country for 
democracy (Lipset, 1994), especially the role of Islam, given that Muslim countries are “democratic 
underachievers” (Fish, 2002: 4). Our data set includes information on the Muslim population for 
all countries from the World Religion Project (Maoz & Henderson, 2013). For similar reasons, we 
also look at ethnic fractionalization using data by Dražanová (2020). Some say that a lack of 
homogeneity in these terms reduces the prospects for democratization (Rabushka & Shepsle, 
1972). 
Finally, we use information on regional levels of democracy as it affects the context in which the 
transition takes place. Democratic transitions should be easier to achieve when surrounded by 
already democratic states that can serve as role models and offer support for democratization. The 
variable also captures regional and potential global trends in democratization over time. The 
regional levels of democracy are calculated by averaging the level of V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy 
Index in the geopolitical region defined by V-Dem’s variable “e_regionpol” (Coppedge et al., 
2020). 
Table 1 presents all variables and data sources. Variables are measured one year before the year of 
regime breakdown (or the latest available year when data are missing). Given the high 
dimensionality of the dataset, we first reduced the number of dimensions using Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). The PCA analysis reveals that over 90% of the variation in the data 




Table 1. Structural variables included in the matching procedure  
 Variable Source 
1 GDP per capita (log) Penn World Tables V9.1 
2 GDP growth per capita Penn World Tables V9.1 
3 Oil and gas production, per capita value Ross and Mahdavi (2014) 
4 Infant mortality rate Gapminder.org as provided by V-Dem (v10) 
5 Civil society strength V-Dem (v10) v2xcs_ccsi index 
6 Human rights protection Human Rights Protection Scores (v3.01) Fariss (2014) 
7 Party-based regime Military dimension index 
8 Monarchy Military dimension index 
9 Military regime Military dimension index 
10 Military size per capita (log) Correlates of War, NMC 5.0 
11 Military expenditures per capita (log) Correlates of War, NMC 5.0 
12 Democracy V-Dem (v10) v2x_polyarchy index  
13 Democratic experience Cumulative sum of V-Dem’s polyarchy index 
14 Leader tenure REIGN data (Bell 2016) 
15 Coup attempt history REIGN data (Bell 2016), sum of previous coup attempts 
16 Civil war (five-year average of conflict 
 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (v19.1) 
17 Urban/rural divide V-Dem (v10) v2pepwrgeo indicator 
18 Political group inequality  V-Dem (v10) v2clpolcl indicator 
19 Regional levels of democracy V-Dem (v10) v2x_polyarchy index, average within e_regionpol 
20 Population (log) Correlates of War, NMC 5.0 
21 Percentage Muslim World Religion Project (1.1) 








Measuring similarity between cases 
Based on the output from the principal component analysis, we calculated the pairwise 
Mahalanobis distances for all cases, using the caseMatch R package (Nielsen, 2016). Figure 1 
summarizes the results. It presents a heatmap of all the pairwise distances between cases in the 
dataset. “Good” comparative cases, i.e., cases characterized by a short Mahalanobis distance, are 
colored in dark purple. “Bad” comparative cases, i.e., cases characterized by a large Mahalanobis 
distance, are represented by a lighter yellow color. In other words, the darkest square in each 
horizontal line marks the most similar transition in terms of structural background factors. The 
figure also shows that some transitions are similar to several other transitions while some appear 
to be rather “unique”. For instance, Nepal’s transition in 2006 (NPL-06) stands out as distinct due 
to the country’s history of civil conflict, the power of the King and the county’s lack of natural 
resources. 
Figure 1: Heat map of Pairwise Distances (Mahalanobis) 
  
Note: The darker the color, the shorter the Mahalanobis distance and thus the more similar the cases.  
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Case study: Sudan in 2019 
Next, we focus on a specific case of authoritarian breakdown, Sudan in 2019, to demonstrate how 
the method can be used to learn lessons from the past. Figure 2 presents the evolution of 
democracy in Sudan based on V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (EDI, credible intervals 
shown in grey). Whereas Sudan has been authoritarian since its independence, it experienced two 
periods of partial liberalization.  The first period began with the so-called “October Revolution” 
of 1964 that toppled president Ibrahim Abbud. The October Revolution ushered in a period of 
civilian rule and partial liberalization that ended with a military coup in 1969. The coup leader, 
Jaafar Nimeiri, himself lost power several years later in 1985 in a popular uprising, which marked 
the beginning of the second liberalization period. This second transition period did not lead to 
democracy either. It ended in 1989 with the coup of Omar al-Bashir (Hassan and Kadouda, 2019), 
who remained in power until 2019. In short, it is not the first time that a mass uprising leads to 
political liberation in Sudan. It is reasonable to study such past experiences in order to learn lessons 
on how to avoid a repetition of these historical scenarios (Dwamena, 2019).  
Figure 2: Democracy in Sudan (1955-2019) 
However, we propose that additional insights can be gained from looking at cases beyond Sudan. 
Whereas other cases of transition may appear very different at first sight, they resemble Sudan on 
a number of relevant dimensions. Figure 3 shows the pairwise distances between Sudan and all 
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other cases of authoritarian breakdown in decreasing order of similarity. The five most similar 
cases to Sudan in 2019 are Sudan in 1985, Haiti in 1986, the Philippines in 1986, Benin in 1990, 
and Burma/Myanmar in 1988. These results are interesting for two reasons. First, they show that 
Sudan’s transition in 2019 shares structural characteristics with several cases in addition to 
historical Sudan, suggesting that additional lessons can be learned from other countries beyond 
Northeastern Africa. Second, they show that Sudan in 2019 does not belong to a cluster of failed 
nor successful transitions. Among the cases of regime breakdowns caused by mass protests that 
are most similar to Sudan, we can find instances of both successful and failed democratization. 
These results are encouraging, as they suggest that although Sudan faces structural obstacles for 
democratization, it is not “destined to fail,” given that other countries facing similar conditions 
have managed to democratize.  
To ensure that our findings are not overly sensitive to the choice of variables included in the 
analysis, we assessed the robustness of our results to removing variables from the matching model. 
We reran the analysis using all combinations of 17 or more of these 22 variables (26,334 
combinations in total). For each case of authoritarian breakdown, we calculated the proportion of 
analyses for which a given case was ranked among the five cases closest to Sudan in 2019. Figure 
4 presents these proportions for all cases. It shows that Sudan in 1985, the Philippines in 1986, 
Benin in 1990, Burma/Myanmar in 1988 and Haiti in 1986 are ranked in the top five comparisons 
across most analyses – the same list of top five countries that also came out of the full model 
reported in Figure 3. These results increase confidence that the distances we computed are not 
overly sensitive to the choice of variables. 
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Figure 4: Sensitivity tests: Proportion of analyses with case ranked closest (top 5) to Sudan 





Our next and final step is a qualitative study of cases that are similar to Sudan in terms of structural 
factors to identify key choices and developments that had a significant impact on the outcome of 
the transition in these cases. Thereby, we can draw lessons for the ongoing transition in Sudan. 
For the analysis in the following section, we considered the five most similar cases as identified by 
the matching procedure. We decided not to look at Sudan’s earlier transition as it is the obvious 
case to turn to for both activists in Sudan and analysts alike (see e.g., Dwamena, 2019). The 
strength of our approach is the identification of less obvious comparative cases. We also decided 
not to investigate the case of Haiti in 1986. Although Haiti is classified as a successful transition 
according to our definition (coded as democratic by GWF five years after the breakdown), there 
were important relapses to authoritarianism in the immediate post-transition period including two 
military coups. It is therefore a case of weak/unconsolidated democratization and not suitable for 
comparative analysis here.  
Therefore, we selected two successful transitions, the Philippines in 1986 and Benin in 1990, as 
well as one failed transition, Burma/Myanmar in 1988, for our attempt to draw lessons for the 
situation in post-Bashir Sudan.  
The Philippines 1986 - successful democratization  
In 1986, large-scale protests against election fraud forced long-time dictator Ferdinand Marcos out 
of power, ushering in a successful transition to democracy in the Philippines. The new government, 
led by Corazon Aquino, faced several obstacles, including a highly politicized military and armed 
insurgencies by communist and Islamist groups. Factions loyal to Marcos tried to sabotage the 
transition on numerous occasions (Timberman, 1991: 169; Thompson, 2004: 28). Yet despite these 
obstacles, the Philippines succeeded in its transition to democracy. Figure 5 summarizes the 







Figure 5: Democracy in the Philippines (1970-1990) 
Existing literature on democratic transition in the Philippines points to several decisions that 
helped democracy take hold during the transition period. One often-noted element is the Aquino 
government’s pragmatism and ability to maintain the support of so-called “constitutionalist” 
elements of the military who favored civilian rule. Shortly after gaining power, the new 
administration nearly lost officers’ support when it sought reconciliation with communist 
insurgents, appointed left-leaning officials and demonstrated an interest in investigating human 
rights abuse and corruption within the armed forces (Timberman, 1991: 252). These decisions 
were highly unpopular amidst military ranks. Ultimately the government rescinded these decisions 
and secured these military factions’ support by maintaining a hardline against insurgents, sacking 
the most controversial figures in the government and abandoning prosecution (Timberman, 1991: 
225). Yet despite these efforts, the government faced insubordination among military ranks and 
suffered coup attempts by mutinous elements of the armed forces. 
Second, the government adopted a cautious approach to reform and was able to maintain the 
support of a broad range of political forces including business interests and landlords (Thompson, 
1996: 189). The approach of the presidency towards the controversial issue of agrarian reform was 
marked by caution in an effort to balance different societal interests. Sustained pressure from 
progressives and landholders led Aquino to decree a reform plan, which was characterized by a 
compromise between both camps and left much of the issue to be decided by congress (Putzel, 
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1992: 235–236). Likewise, observers agree that the composition of the constitutional commission 
appointed by Aquino reflected broad interests (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005: 233; Timberman, 
1991: 178). Caution was also reflected in the government’s restraint in using the powers at its 
disposal. For instance, the government refrained from declaring martial law after the coup attempt 
of August 1987 (Timberman 1991: 192, 200). 
Third, pro-democratic forces were able to secure support from powerful international actors. 
Specifically, the United States played a crucial role in supporting the transition, condemning coup 
attempts against the transitional government and even intervening during the December 1989 
putsch. This is despite the fact that the fall of Marcos, a long-time U.S. ally, and its replacement by 
a civilian government representing a broader range of political opinion, was plausibly threatening 
to U.S. interests. The military bases the U.S. maintained in the Philippines were unpopular and 
Aquino even pledged for their removal in the runoff to the presidential election in 1986. Yet she 
changed her position and successfully maintained U.S. support for the transition (Thompson, 
1996: 190–191). 
Even though the Philippine transition serves as a case of successful democratization (at least until 
a first decline in democratic quality at the beginning of the 2000s), there have also been some 
shortcomings that can inform cases like Sudan. This includes the failure of the civilian 
administration to institutionalize the people power movement. The Aquino government refrained 
from building a strong party organization that could have served as an independent power base. 
These deficiencies meant that the government had no other option than to rely on the support of 
moderate parts of the military and traditional political elites narrowing the leeway for political 
reform (Timberman 1991: 238–239).  
Benin 1990 - successful democratization 
In response to an ongoing economic crisis and growing domestic political unrest, the President of 
Benin, Mathieu Kérékou, convened a National Conference in 1990, which included both 
government and opposition forces. This conference paved the road for Benin’s first free and fair 
elections in 1991.   
According to Levitsky and Way (2010: 236), Benin in the early 1990s “lacked favourable conditions 
for democracy”. Similar to many other authoritarian regimes in Africa, it was “poor, rural, and had 
small middle classes and weak civil societies” (ibid: 236). Thus, a successful democratization 
process in Benin did not seem very likely. Therefore, Benin is often referred to as a “deviant case” 
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which is not well explained by structural theories of democratization (Gisselquist, 2008). And still, 
democratic transition in Benin was possible and did happen. Figure 6 illustrates the 
democratization process using V-Dem data.  
In the case of Benin, most observers argue that the effective and inclusive way in which pro-
democratic actors organized and pressured the transitional government was the key to democratic 
success. The activists first successfully pushed for their adequate inclusion in the National 
Conference in 1990 during the so-called “quota wars” (Bayer, 2018: 18). Gisselquist (2008: 807) 
further points out that it was critical that the actors involved in the National Conference did not 
focus on “narrow ethnic interests” but instead organized as “clearly ‘Beninese’ groups, 
representing the interests of students, businesses, trade unions, and so forth.” Then they adopted 
political agendas and formed new parties to participate in the transitional elections in 1991 
(Heilbrunn, 1993). After that, accountability mechanisms – elections, legislature, civil society, 
media and civil society – successfully constrained the power of subsequent presidents. For 
instance, a massive civil society campaign under the slogan of “Don’t touch my constitution” 
stopped Kérékou, who ruled again from 1996-2006, and his successor Boni from extending term 
limits (Bayer, 2018: 30). 
Figure 6: Democracy in Benin (1970-2000) 
In the 1991 parliamentary election, 37 parties merged together in seven coalitions, competed and 
as in the National Congress some of them managed to bridge ethnic and regional divides 
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(Heilbrunn, 1993: 295). Such cross-cutting cleavages and overlapping memberships of groups, are 
according to Cohen and Arato (1994), a “presupposition for a stable democratic polity, [and] a 
guarantee against permanent domination by any one group.”  
Still, diversity and ethnicity have shaped Benin’s politics and the distribution of public goods, but 
none of the major candidates has tried gaining votes on this issue, thereby avoiding ethnic conflicts 
(Gisselquist, 2008). Levitsky and Way (2010: 294) further suggest that party and state weakness 
helped democracy in Benin. No political leader controlled a party that was strong enough to muster 
support for abusing power or weakening the opposition.  
Three additional factors for Benin’s success are often emphasized in the literature: reconciliation, 
the weak military and international assistance. First, many observers note that swift reconciliation 
with old regime elites was highly conducive to the success of democratization (Bayer, 2018: 18; 
Gisselquist, 2008; Heilbrunn, 1993; Nzouankeu, 1993). After the transitional elections, incumbent 
Kérékou only conceded electoral defeat “when he was granted immunity for crimes committed 
during his term in office” (Gisselquist, 2008: 798). This allowed him to leave “in honor” (Bayer, 
2018: 18). However, the Beninese Communist Party, the strongest pro-democracy party at the 
time, was opposed to the reconciliatory approach and even boycotted the National Conference 
demanding that Kérékou be prosecuted (Gisselquist, 2008: 796). Thus, the decision not to trial 
members of the authoritarian regime elite could have jeopardized the transitional process.  
Second, Benin’s military was small and it did not attempt to spoil the transition. For instance, 
Kérékou’s Presidential Guard numbered no more than two thousand (Decalo, 1997: 47). 
Furthermore, military officers did not remain loyal to Kérékou. Whereas hardliners within the 
regime pressed Kérékou to dissolve the Conference, the military clearly signaled they would not 
back such a move (Decalo, 1997: 51-53; Omitoogun & Onigo-Itite, 1996: 16). 
Third, international actors – in particular the French government – clearly backed the democratic 
transition by offering to pay for the National Congress (Gisselquist, 2008: 796, 807) and providing 
economic assistance to the first democratically elected government (Bayer, 2018: 18).  
As Figure 6 indicates, Benin achieved stable levels of democracy following the transition at the 
beginning of the 1990s and despite some very recent drawbacks, Freedom House stated in 2019 
that Benin “remains among the most stable democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, having witnessed 
21 
multiple free and fair elections and peaceful transfers of power since its transition to democracy 
in 1991”.4  
Burma/Myanmar 1988 - failed democratization 
The wave of protests that led to the 1988 popular uprising in Burma/Myanmar began in September 
1987 when president Ne Win “eliminated 25-, 35-, and 75-Kyat currency notes, nullifying between 
60 and 80 percent of the currency in circulation” (Thompson, 1999: 34), sparking broad uproar 
and a wave of student protests. Protestors achieved a partial victory when Ne Win resigned on 23 
July in 1988. However, he appointed General Sein Lwin – notorious for atrocities – as his 
successor, thus sparking more protests. On 8 August 1988 the unrest culminated in a nationwide 
general strike (the “8-8-88 uprising”) and hundreds of thousands protesting across the country. 
Figure 7 gives an overview of the timeline of the (failed) transition.  
Figure 7: Democracy in Burma/Myanmar (1960-2000) 
On 12 August 1988 Sein Lwin resigned suddenly and without explanation, which “left many 
protestors confused and jubilant” (Boudreau, 2004: 205). Following pressure to form a civilian 
government, writer Dr. Maung Maung was appointed as head of government on 19 August and 
both protests and repression halted briefly (Fink, 2001). During this “democracy summer”, many 
former democracy leaders returned, such as former Prime Minister U Nu, retired Brigadier General 
4 See https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2019 
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Aung Gyi (Smith, 1999), and Aung San Suu Kyi, 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, entered the 
political arena and joined with the protestors, urging the crowd not to turn on the army but find 
peace through nonviolent means (Fink, 2001: 60; Fong, 2008: 150).  
The ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) announced they would be organizing an 
election, but opposition parties called for the party’s immediate resignation, the creation of an 
interim government and quick elections (Fong, 2008: 150) After the BSPP rejected these demands, 
protesters again took to the streets on 12 September 1988 (Fong, 2008: 150), demanding immediate 
change (Maung, 1999). 
The peaceful protests were met with violent repression by the military, which gained control of 
the country in September 1988 (Alagappa, 1995: 170; Smith, 1999). General Saw Maung abolished 
the 1974 constitution and installed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). He 
became an even more repressive leader than former Prime Minister Ne Win (Delang, 2000). 
Thousands of protesters were killed or disappeared and the movement collapsed in October 1988 
(Tucker 2011: 291). 
Nevertheless, in May 1990, the SLORC held (relatively) free elections, which the opposition party, 
the National League for Democracy (NLD) won unexpectedly, whereas the National Unity Party 
(NUP), favored by the military, clearly lost. However, the SLORC refused to convene a Legislative 
Assembly after the elections and to hand over power. Instead, it ruled until 2011 without 
meaningful democratization (see Figure 7).  
Why did democratization fail in Burma/Myanmar? And could pro-democratic activists have done 
anything differently to achieve a better outcome? The clearest political opening was from August 
to September 1988. In August 1988, Dr. Maung Maung, a civilian, was appointed chairman of the 
BSPP and head of government (Fink, 2001). He offered to organize multiparty elections within 
three months (Tonkin, 2007: 37). Yet this offer was rejected by the opposition and its emerging 
political leaders, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung Gyi, Tin Oo and U Nu. These opposition leaders 
did not recognize the Election Commission as impartial because it had been appointed by a 
compromised administration (Tonkin, 2007: 37). Instead, they called for the government’s 
immediate resignation and the establishment of an interim administration composed of non-BSPP 
personalities to allow an interim government to organize elections (Fong, 2008: 150; Tonkin, 2007: 
37). The BSPP rejected those demands and protesters took to the streets again on 12 September 
1988 (Fong, 2008: 150). 
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Tonkin (2007: 37) argues that it “is possible that if the emerging political leaders […] had agreed 
to this [the BSPP’s proposal] and had been willing to accept the nominated Election Commission 
to supervise the elections, the 18 September 1988 coup might never have happened”. That said, 
protesters in Burma/Myanmar had reasons to worry about the BSPP’s proposal. According to 
Reilly (2016: 13), “establishing an independent electoral commission should be one of the first 
steps in a transitional electoral timetable”. The election management in Burma/Myanmar was not 
independent at that time. Even though being one of the key demands of the opposition, the 
government never granted them representation in the election commission (Watcher, 1989: 180). 
Thus, it is not obvious that Burma would have democratized had the protesters agreed to elections 
without institutional safeguards.  
Furthermore, after the 18 September coup, many students did not regroup as peaceful protesters; 
instead, they chose armed struggle against the SLORC and fled to the jungle (Thompson, 1999: 
36). They put their hopes in receiving support from foreign countries and cooperating with ethnic 
insurgents – hopes which never were fulfilled (Thompson, 1999: 36). Instead, the military 
intensified its grip on political power.  
Discussion 
In order for a democratic transition to succeed, several factors need to align. In Benin in 1990, 
pro-democratic forces were relatively united in their desire to make democracy work. They 
maintained a commitment to pluralism and no societal group reneged on democracy out of fear 
that a rival group would dominate. Furthermore, the military decided not to intervene on the side 
of the former dictator, Kérékou, who conceded defeat in the transitional elections thanks to an 
amnesty guarantee. In the Philippines in 1986, the Aquino government dealt with dissatisfaction 
within the military and even suffered coup attempts that almost ended the democratic transition. 
Yet it was able to maintain the support of core factions within the military through a politics of 
moderation and compromise. Likewise, the Aquino government was able to obtain support from 
the United States for the democratic transition. The support of a powerful foreign patron in favor 
of democracy likely played an important role in preventing its democratic breakdown. In 
Burma/Myanmar in 1988, it is difficult to attribute democratization failure to one specific factor 
or decision made by pro-democratic forces. The military decided to crack down on the protests 




This study proposes an innovative, quantitative strategy for identifying cases for comparative 
studies on successful and failing transitional processes.  Comparing all 44 successful and failed 
transitions to democracy since 1945 based on 22 key structural factors and matching techniques 
allows us to identify suitable, similar cases for comparison beyond the typical, regional approach. 
In an empirical application of this method, we draw lessons that can be helpful for understanding 
the current transition in Sudan. Almost two years after the overthrow of long-time dictator Omar 
Al-Bashir, the transition is still ongoing and its outcome is uncertain. Our paper reports some 
reason for cautious optimism for Sudan. Out of the four historical cases that are most similar to 
Sudan in 2019, two democratized --- Benin 1990 and the Philippines in 1986 --- and two did not, 
Myanmar in 1988 and Sudan in 1986. This analysis suggests that despite the major challenges faced, 
the outcome of the transition in Sudan is not pre-determined by structural conditions. 
Whereas structural factors do not determine the fate of these transitions, they still can create 
substantial challenges for pro-democratic actors and may strengthen the position of non-
democratic actors, including security forces. An entrenched military that believes a democratic 
transition threatens its interest, or a foreign power that is unwilling to support the democratic 
process, can be enough to derail democratization efforts.  
What can pro-democracy activists in Sudan learn from failed and successful democratization 
efforts in the Philippines, Benin and Myanmar? The case studies have shown the importance of 
maintaining broad alliances and the willingness to compromise on specific policy issues and 
reforms. At the same time – while it is important that activists and the military cooperate, activists 
should push back against military overreach during the transition. Pro-democracy forces need to 
make sure that civilian actors are represented in transitional governance bodies and are able to 
keep the military in check. Mass-based nonviolent action can help to ensure accountability of elites 
and steer the transition process. Finally, international support can be conducive to 
democratization.   
Despite the fact that the Sudanese transition process has already come further than 
Burma/Myanmar in 1988, the country has a history of short-lived time periods where it seemed 
that civilian rule was possible (1956-57; 1964-69; 1985-1989). While the process in Sudan is fragile, 
the Juba peace agreement and the Sudan partnership conference with the European Union and 
the United Nations in 2020 are rays of hope. To not repeat the mistakes of the past, pro-democratic 
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Figure A.1: Variance explained by principal components 
 
